

NEW YORK TIMES

FEB 19 1964

Foreign Affairs

Through a Gaullist Glass Darkly

By C. L. SULZBERGER

PARIS—The unsettling effect of Gaullism has shocked Europe out of previous policy patterns without as yet, after five years, fixing new ones. This turbid condition has direct repercussions on United States planning and it will probably be impossible to discern what all this means to the NATO world for some time to come.

The Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations will first have to advance sufficiently to judge whether U.S. trade concepts can gain European endorsement. We may have to reassess this Continent's most vital internal relations, those between France and Germany. And, there will be a general election setting guidelines for British policy.

As a symbol of revived European self-confidence and a reversion to nationalism, Gaullism is in a sense distinct from de Gaulle, whose foreign policy aims primarily at greater French influence. Although Britain suffered from France's particular bias, there is nevertheless a kind of British "Gaullism" which will play its electoral role.

The Tories make plain that in their campaign to hold office they will insist on British retention of a national nuclear deterrent, one of de Gaulle's own precepts. And, contrary to expectations, the General's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market has not in the end much increased anti-French feeling.

Indeed, some Englishmen envy the way de Gaulle has managed to assert himself. Others claim his brutal methods saved the Commonwealth by keeping Britain out of "Europe." Still others think this enabled London to reaffirm its treasured special ties with Washington. And British farmers, who worried lest their privileged position might be sacrificed, feel relieved.

Labor Government Views

These attitudes primarily concern factions of the Conservative party and are unlikely to prevent a Labor victory. And a Labor government's policy on Europe, France, and above all, West Germany, is unpredictable.

Germany meanwhile finds itself between two stools—the desire to bind itself more tightly to the U.S.A., and the link forged by its treaty of cooperation with France. Bonn admires American strength and realizes this provides ultimate military protection. But it begins to see the dream of superseding Britain in our regard is fictional, and it fears certain implications of United States foreign policy.

The Germans dislike direct negotiations between Washington and Moscow, and believe these can only lead to tangible results at Bonn's expense. They fear a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Alliance and stationing of observers on both sides of the Iron Curtain would mean tacit recognition of East Germany.

In reverse, they are inclined to like that aspect of French foreign policy which opposes concessions to Moscow. Bonn shares with Paris the idea that the West should not favor Russia over China. The Germans support Washington's proposal for a NATO nuclear fleet; indeed, they helped elaborate it. But they wonder if it will materialize.

De Gaulle meanwhile offers Bonn tempting collaboration in economic and military fields and hints at political reprisal if this is spurned.

Thus the political solidarity of NATO's main partners is confused on the eve of the critical Geneva tariff talks. France, by a triumph inside the Common Market, has already made it probable that agriculture cannot be included in trade liberalization to the degree Washington had hoped; and industrial tariffs will be fixed largely on Common Market terms.

The U.S.A. wants to sell more to Europe, helping to ease our payments balance crisis. But the Europeans are increasingly fascinated by long-range opportunities of trading with the Communist bloc.

Perhaps commercial developments this year will be of greater significance than diplomatic developments. But the former depend largely upon the latter. There is a contest for new balances within the West.

Nobody disputes the overwhelming U.S. military ascendancy, but everybody assumes there will be no major war. Therefore, this power advantage is discounted. The competition is now for political and economic ascendancy. And de Gaulle has placed France and Europe in a position of greater bargaining strength than Washington foresaw when the crucial Kennedy Round was conceived.